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tion and rescission is great, an award of damages may indeed be unduly 
burdensome. Second, if a creditor fails to take the necessary steps to 
effectuate the consumer's rescission, the consumer is allowed to keep the 
property without obligation.68 In such a case an additional award of 
damages may actually subject a creditor to two penalties; the caveat seeks 
to avoid this result. 
Judge Wright, Circuit Judge of the Ninth Circuit, stated in Palmer v. 
Wilson: " [He] would limit the court's equitable discretion [to refuse a 
monetary award] to cases where a civil penalty would be an inequitable 
windfall to an overreaching [consumer] . "69 The two previous examples 
would fall within this category. 
Allowing courts this discretionary power will have little effect upon 
the Act. The creditor is deterred in any event. He must disclose accord- 
ing to the Act's requirements, for a court would surely award penalties 
regardless of any resulting harshness if he deliberately fails to disclose. 
The ever-present threat of both sanctions insures creditor adherence to 
the Act; without this threat rescission might not be sufficient to enforce 
disclosure compliance.70 
Criminal Procedure - PAROLE REVOCATION HEARINGS -REQUIRING 
THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD OF PROOF AND THE APPLICATION OF
DOUBLE JEOPARDY PRINCIPLES -Standlee v. Smith, 83 Wash. 2d 405, 
5 18 P.2d 721 (1974). 
Daryl Standlee, a Washington State parolee,' was charged with abduc- 
tion, assault, attempted rape, and molesting a minor. Proceedings to 
suspend his parole began following the charges but were stayed pending 
a criminal trial. Even though Standlee was acquitted at trial on an alibi 
defense, the prison authorities, considering the same evidence, ruled he 
had violated his parole and revoked it. The only factual issue in either 
proceeding was the identity of the assailant. Standlee sought a writ of 
habeas corpus, contending that collateral estoppel2 prevented the reliti- 
6815 U.S.C. 5 1635(b) (1970). This result was reached in Sosa v .  Fite, 498 F .  2d 114 (5th Cir. 
1974), where 2 years after siding was installed on a consumer's residence the consumer was 
allowed to rescind the transaction because disclosure of credit terms had not been made. Be- 
cause of the creditor's failure to effectuate rescission the consumer was allowed to keep the 
siding without obligation. In addition, it should be noted that the consumer was awarded 
attorney's fees even though the rescission section of the Act does not provide for them. 
69502 F.2d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 1974) (Judge Wright, concurring in part and dissenting in  
part). Judge Wright dissented from the majority conclusion that a court could condition 
rescission on repayment by a debtor. He stated the right to rescind was unconditional. 
'Osee Boyd at 182-83; Griffith at 16-17; Private Remedies, supra note 39, at 207. 
'Standlee's prior conviction was for rape. Petitioner's Brief for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 
iv, Standlee v. Smith, 83 Wash. 2d 405,518 P.2d 721 (1974). 
2 
Res Judicata necessitates an identity of causes of action, while the invocation of collateral 
estoppel does not. . . . Where there is a second action between the parties, or their privies, 
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gation of issues in a parole revocation hearing previously adjudicated in 
a criminal trial. The court of appeals denied the writ and the Washing- 
ton State Supreme Court affirmed, upholding the revocation of Stand- 
lee's parole. It reasoned that the standard of proof in a parole revocation 
hearing is less than that required in a criminal trial, thus denying the 
application of collateral estoppel to prevent the relitigation of issues in 
the revocation hearing.3 
It is generally held by state and federal courts that the standard of 
proof in parole revocation hearings is less than that required in a criminal 
trial.4 State courts generally require that the hearing officer be reason- 
ably satisfied that the parole has been violated;5 and while a definitive 
standard for federal boards has not been set by the Supreme Court, it ap- 
pears such boards are also required to find violations based on satisfactory 
evidence.6 Appellate courts reviewing parole board rulings only exam- 
ine the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether the parole 
authority has been capricious or arbitrary in revoking the parole.7 
Evidentiary standards for revocation hearings, however, may shortly 
come under greater scrutiny in view of recent United States Supreme 
Court decisions broadening due process requirements for parolees. In 
Morrzssey v .  Brewer8 the Court required that a parolee be afforded a pre- 
liminary hearing in order to meet the requirements of due process when 
who are bound by a judgment rendered in a prior suit, but the second action involves a 
different claim, cause, or demand, the judgment in the first suit operates as a collateral 
estoppel as to, but only as to, those matters or points which were in issue or contraverted 
and upon the determination of w h i l  the initial judgment necessarily depended. 
1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 7 0.441 [2], at 3777 (2d ed. 1974) (footnotes omitted). 
3Standlee v. Smith, 83 Wash. 2d 405, 518 P.2d 721 (1974). 
4See United States v. D'Amato, 429 F.2d 1284, 1286 (3d Cir. 1970); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 
225, 241-42, 244 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); cases cited note 5 infra; see also 
ANNOT., 29 A.L.R. 1074 (1953). 
5See, e.g., People v. Whittaker, 101 Ill. App. 2d 432,243 N.E.2d 467 (1968) (preponderance); 
People v. Kuduk, 320 Ill. App. 610, 51 N.E.2d 997 (1943) (reasonable doubt is not required); 
State v. Whilhite, 492 S.W.2d 397,399 (Mo. App. 1973) (reasonable satisfaction). 
Wnited States v. D'Amato, 429 F.2d 1284, 1286 (3d Cir. 1970); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 
241-42, 244 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Note, Parole Revocation in the 
Federal System, 56 GEO. L.J. 705, 717 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Parole Revocation in the 
Federal System); 6 SUFF. UNIV. L. &v. 1206 (1972); see also Arciniega v. Freeman, 404 U.S. 4 
(1971); 28 C.F.R. 235 (1974) (satisfactory evidence is necessary to issue an arrest warrant on a 
parolee). 
'Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216,222 (1932); Caton v. Smith, 486 F.2d 733, 735 (7th Cir. 
1973); In  re McLain, 55 Cal. 2d 78, 84, 9 Cal. Rptr. 824, 830, 357 P.2d 1080, 1086 (Sup. Ct. 
1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 10 (1961); Johnson v. Stucker, 203 Kan. 253, 260,453 P.2d 35, 42 
(1969); Cohen, Due Process, Equal Protection and State Parole Revocation Proceedings, 42 
U. COL. L. REV. 197,210 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Cohen). 
8408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
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depriving him of his valuable conditional l i b e r t ~ , ~  and in Gagnon v.  
Scarpellilo the Court added the right to counsel under certain circum- 
stances.ll In the earlier decision of In re WinshiP,12 the Court specifi- 
cally held that the reasonable doubt standard of proof for criminal prose- 
cutions is a due process requirement, and that due process mandates this 
same standard for juvenile hearings. l3 The Court in Morrissey and 
Gagnon did not consider what standard of proof due process requires for 
parole revocation hearings, leaving the question of whether the princi- 
ples of Winship apply to parolees as well as juveniles. A second issue, 
related to the applicable standard of proof, is whether the double jeop- 
ardy clause of the fifth amendment allows the result reached in Standlee. 
The trend14 has been to increase the protections for parolees. This note 
will discuss whether this trend includes the reasonable doubt standard of 
proof and the application of double jeopardy principles for parole revoca- 
tion hearings. 
Standlee contended that collateral estoppel should have prevented the 
parole board from relitigating issues of fact which had been previously 
resolved in his favor in a criminal prosecution. While the Washington 
State Supreme Court agreed that the collateral estoppel doctrine is a 
necessary incident of the fifth amendment's guarantee against double 
jeopardy, it agreed with other jurisdictions holding that a parole revoca- 
tion hearing is not a criminal prosecution.l5 It reasoned that parole 
revocation is not punishment for conduct violative of the terms and con- 
ditions of the parole, but simply a continuation of punishment for an 
original conviction. These distinctions, according to the court., support 
the position that a different standard of proof is permitted in the revoca- 
tion hearing from that required at a criminal trial. The result is that 
collateral estoppel does not prevent the relitigation of issues in the sub- 
91d. at 484. 
1°41 1 U.S. 778 (1973). 
llZd. at 790. The Court said counsel should be provided when the parolee denies the al- 
leged parole violations or where there are mitigating circumstances for parole violation which 
would either be difficult to present at the hearing or make revocation inappropriate. 
12397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
'3Id. at 368. 
l4For a comprehensive review of the history of parole revocation hearings in the state and 
federal jurisdictions see Cohen, supra note 7; Parole Revocation in the Federal System, supra 
note 6 ;  Note, Parole Revocation Procedures, 65 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1951) (hereinafter cited as 
Parole Revocation Procedures), Comment, Reuocation of Conditional Liberty - California 
and the Federal System, 28 S. CAL. L. REV. 158 (1955); Comment, The Parole System, 120 U .  
PA. L. REV. 282, 342-58 (1971) (hereinafter cited as The Parole System). 
'583 Wash. 2d at 407,518 P.2d at 722, citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
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sequent parole hearing.16 As authority for denying the application of 
collateral estoppel, the court relied on two federal tax decisions disallow- 
ing application of the doctrine in behalf of taxpayers in civil suits which 
were subsequent to criminal prosecutions in which they were found not 
quilty under a different standard of proof.l7 
The court acknowledged that revocation hearings are subject to some 
due process requirements, but that those requirements did not prohibit 
its holding. '8 
Justice Utter argued in dissent that due process required the reason- 
able doubt standard of proof for parole revocation hearings. He also 
argued that collateral estoppel should, therefore, apply and-prohibit the 
reli tigat ion of issues resolved at trial. lg 
A. Due Process and the Reasonable Doubt Standard of Proof 
Essential to the majority holding is the proposition that due process 
does not require the reasonable doubt standard of proof for parole revo- 
cation hearings because such hearings are not criminal proceedings. The 
majority of state and federal decisions support this position20 and are 
summarized by the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey: " [TI he 
revocation of parole is not a part of a criminal prosecution and thus the 
full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply 
to parole  revocation^."^^ However, the trend away from the traditional 
viewZ2 of the purposes and characterizations of parole revocation hear- 
ings was also suggested in the Morrissey opinion: 
1683 Wash. 2d 405,40748,518 P.2d 721,722-23. 
l71d. citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) and Neaderland v. Commissioner, 
424 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1970). 
'883 Wash. 2d at 409, 518 P.2d at 723. Here the court was referring to language in Morrissey 
v .  Brewer, 408 U.S. at 480. The court did not consider whether the principles outlined in 
Morrissey affected the standard of proof to be applied at parole revocation hearings. 
1983 Wash. 2d at 410,518 P.2d at 724. 
20See cases and authorities cited in notes 3-7 supra. 
Z1408 U.S. at 480. 
22Cohen, supra note 7, at 206-13; The Parole System, supra note 6, at 284-89. The following 
theories have been used to deny due process protections for parolees in revocation hearing: 
Right - Privilege Distinction. The principal case is Escoe v.  Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935), 
where the Court said that parole is a privilege and a matter of grace rather than a right. Its 
reasoning is that due process only protects against invasion of rights held under the Constitu- 
tion and not mere privileges. This distinction is no longer dispositive and was buried for the 
purposes of parole revocation hearings by Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,482 (1972). 
Constructive Custody. By this approach, courts have denied procedural due process because 
the parolee was held to have been serving his sentence in an expanded prison wall. Since the 
parolee is thought to remain within the custody of the prison, he has no freedom for due 
process to protect. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963); McCoy v. Harris, 108 Utah 
407,408, 160 P.2d 721,722 (1945). 
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[TI he liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the 
core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a "grievous 
loss" on the parolee and often on others. . . . By whatever name, the 
liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the Four- 
teenth Amendment. Its termination calls for some orderly process, how- 
ever informal.23 
This passage indicates the social and legal interests supporting the exten- 
sion of due process safeguards to a parolee. On one hand the government 
has an interest in returning to prison a parolee who has violated the con- 
ditions of his parole. Underlying this interest are many of the same con- 
siderations which motivate the government to imprison a person for a 
crime, such as the public safety and welfare, protection of property, 
respect for law, and rehabilitation.24 On the other hand is the parolee's 
interest in his conditional liberty and the due process guarantees in- 
volved when one is deprived of liberty.25 
It is clear that the state has an interest in exercising more control over 
parolees than it exercises over the general citizenry, but it is not clear that 
a standard of proof for revocation hearings lower than the reasonable 
doubt standard better serves the interests of the public. Just as with a 
criminal, the sovereign has an interest in assuring the fair treatment of a 
parolee, especially when he denies the allegations that he violated his 
parole. The Supreme Court has indicated special concern for a revoca- 
tion hearing involving a parolee who denies he has violated his parole. 
In Gagnon the Court held that due process requires that counsel be pro- 
vided when a parolee denies the acts which are the basis for the revoca- 
Contract Theory. Under this theory it is held that when a parole is granted, the parolee 
contracts with the sovereign and agrees to act within the terms and conditions of his parole. 
Failure to meet those terms results in the loss of all the rights he held under the contract, and 
it is held that due process does not prevent this forfeiture. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 
(7 Pet.) 150, 161 (1833). 
Civil - Criminal Distinction. Many courts do not allow due process protections for a 
parolee as a result of the holding that a parole revocation hearing is not a criminal proceeding. 
Standlee is an example of this reasoning. 
Parens Patriae. This phrase is to explain the identity of interest a parole board is supposed 
to have with the parolee in his rehabilitation. It  is argued that one need not be protected from 
another who has an identity of interest and that procedural safeguards are not necessary. 
Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403,407 (2d Cir. 1970). 
Statutory. It has been held that the rights of a parolee are statutory only and are therefore 
not protected by the Constitution. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935). 
Exhausted Rights Theory. Since the parolee was given full constitutional protection at his 
original trial, it is not necessary to further protect him and his parole can be revoked at any- 
time. Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32, 26 So. 146 (1899); In re Patterson, 94 Kan. 439, 442, 146 P. 
1009, lo l l  (1915). 
231d. at 482; see Cohen, supra note 7 at 201. 
24Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 483; see generally The Parole System, supra note 14, at 
347. 
25The Parole System at 346; for cases representing the view that the parolee's loss of free- 
dom outweighs an increased state burden in affording due process guarantees in parole revo- 
cation hearings see cases cited in Cohen, supra note 7, at 209 11-78. 
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tion of his parole.26 The Morrissey decision also indicated the Court's 
concern for procedural safeguards when a parolee's conduct is in issue. 
The court asserted no fewer than three times that the first stage of the 
parole revocation hearing is to be a determination of whether the parolee 
had "in fact" violated his par0le.~7 By requiring that counsel be provided 
when acts of violation are denied and in unequivocally using the phrase 
in  fact when speaking of parole revocation, the Court is emphasizing the 
importance of protecting the parolee at this stage of the hearing. Al- 
though the standard of proof in a parole revocation hearing has not been 
considered since Morrissey and Gugnon, the expanding due process re- 
quirements recognized in those two cases may be sufficient to encompass 
the reasonable doubt standard of proof. 
In the similar area of juvenile hearing~,~g the United States Supreme 
Court has specifically held that the fifth and fourteenth amendments 
require the reasonable doubt standard of proof to prove alleged criminal 
acts.29 A review of the history of juvenile hearing decisions of the Su- 
preme Court shows that due process requirements for juvenile hearings 
were expanded in much the same way as they are now being expanded 
for revocation hearings.30 By its decision in In  re Guult,3l the Court pro- 
vided accused juveniles the due process protections of notice of charges, 
the right to counsel, the right to be confronted by and examine witnesses, 
and the privilege against self-in~rimination.3~ Following Gault, the 
Court in In re Winship specified the standard of proof required by due 
process for juvenile hearings, stating: 
[TI he constitutional safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is as 
much required during the adjudicating stage of a delinquency proceed- 
ing as are those constitutional safeguards applied in Gadt  . . . .33 
In Gadt  the Court decided that all the due process requirements of a 
criminal trial are not necessary for juvenile hearings, but did require "the 
essentials of due process and fair treatment."s4 By requiring the reason- 
26411 U.S. at 790. 
27408 U.S. at 479,483-84, 487-88. 
28Cohen, supra note 7, at 212: 
[I] n an area closely analogous to parole revocation proceedings in both philosophy and 
procedure, juvenile delinquency proceedings, the United States Supreme Court rejected 
most of [the theories similar to the traditional views of parole] which had theretofore 
been accepted as reasons for denying traditional due process safeguards to juveniles. 
29172 re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). 
3OFor a history of juvenile court cases and the evolution of due process for juveniles see In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12-31 (1967) and Ketcham, Legal Renaissance in the Juvenile Court, 60 
Nw. U.L. REV. 585 (1965). 
31387 U.S. 1 (1965). 
32Id. at 31-58; In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 368. 
33397 U.S. at 368. 
34387 U.S. at 30; 397 U.S. at 359. 
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able doubt standard of proof in Winship the Court has placed this stan- 
dard of proof in the category of "the essentials of due process and fair 
treatment. "35 
Morrissey and Gagnon exhibit the same procedural concerns with 
respect to parole revocation hearings as Gault represents for juvenile 
hearings. These concerns are manifest because it is recognized that lib- 
erty is being taken and must be done so constitutionally.36 Because 
parole revocation hearings, just as juvenile hearings, may result in im- 
prisonment, the Morrissey and Gagnon decisions suggest that due pro- 
cess should also require the reasonable doubt standard of proof in parole 
revocation hearings. 
The traditional theories of parole and parole revocation37 have 
avoided due process requirements for parolees.38 For example, courts 
have reasoned that a parolee is not being returned to prison for the viola- 
tion of his parole, but only to serve the remainder of the sentence im- 
posed for his original crime.39 The Morrissey decision undermines these 
theories by stating that a parolee possesses "core values of unqualified 
liberty," the loss of which would be griev0us.4~ Regardless of the theory 
a parole board uses for reincarcerating a parolee, the fact remains that 
liberty is taken from the parolee. The same standard should apply for 
parolees as is used in criminal and juvenile cases without regard to the 
degree or nature of the liberty being taken. 
It has been further suggested that there are questions a hearing officer 
must decide which are not consistent with the use of the higher standard 
of proof, such as whether the parolee is likely to commit another criminal 
act if granted continued parole and whether he has demonstrated suf- 
- ficient rehabilitation to warrant relea~e.4~ The reasoning is that these 
questions are judgmental, discretionary, and not susceptible of specific 
proot making it impractical to hold the decision makers to a strict stan- 
dard of proof.42 However, these discretionary questions arise in the sec- 
ond stage of the parole revocation hearing and are improper if the 
parolee did not violate the terms and conditions of his parole. Chief 
Justice Burger outlined the stages of a revocation hearing in Morrissey, 
stating: 
35The Court defined the issue in Winship as "whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
among the 'essentials of due process and fair treatment' . . . ." 397 U.S. at 359. 
36See note 23 and accompanying text supra. 
37See note 22 supra. 
38Cohen, supra note 7, at 206. 
39Zd. at 21 1 ;  see also note 14 supra. 
40408 U.S. at 482. 
4lTobriner and Cohen, How Much Process is "Due"? Parolees and Prisoners, 25 HASTINGS 
L.J. 801,810 (1974). 
42Zd. 
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The first step in a revocation decision thus involves a wholly retrospec- 
tive factual question: whether the parolee has in fact acted in violation of 
one or more conditions of his parole. Only if it is determined that the 
parolee did violate the conditions does the second question arise: should 
the parolee be recommitted to prison or should other steps be taken to 
protect society and improve chances of rehabilitation?43 
Of the severability of these two stages, the Chief Justice further said: 
A simple factual hearing will not interfere with the exercise of discre- 
tion. . . . 
This discretionary aspect of the revocation decision need not be 
reached unless there is first an appropriate determination that the in- 
dividual has in fact breached the conditions of parole. The parolee is not 
.the only one who has a stake in his conditional liberty. Society has a stake 
in whatever may be the chance of restoring him to normal and useful life 
within the law. Society thus has an interest in not having parole revoked 
because of erroneous information or because of an erroneous evaluation 
of the need to revoke parole, given the breach of parole c0nditions.~4 
Under this two-step procedure, the use of the reasonable doubt standard 
of proof will not interfere with the discretionary aspects of the board's 
decision.45 If revocation is based on denied allegations of parole viola- 
tion, then those allegations should be proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
or the discretionary stage of the hearing should not be reached. 
Parole is a universal feature of the modern penal system and some 
jurisdictions have provisions for automatic par0le.~6 It has been esti- 
mated that 35 to 45 percent of all parolees have their paroles revoked and 
are returned to prison.47 This high frequency of revocation indicates 
the increased possibility that a parolee may be reimprisoned who is ac- 
tually innocent of any parole violations. This is the same fundamental 
concern that has led to the use of the reasonable doubt standard of proof 
in criminal prosecutions. 
The higher standard of proof in parole revocation hearings will have 
the further advantage of requiring judges and hearing officers to be more 
careful in passing judgment on the evidence, leaving fewer opportunities 
for capricious or arbitrary acti0n.~8 Further, the parolee should perceive 
43408 U.S. at 479-80. 
441d. at 183-84. 
45Indeed, as Chief Justice Burger implies, one standard of proof will not burden the discre- 
tion of a parole board any more than any other standard of proof. 
46408 U.S. at 477; e.g., 18 U.S.C. $ 4163 (1971). 
47408 U.S. at  479. According to a 1973 report, 60 percent of all felons released in 1968 from 
prisons in state and federal jurisdictions are released on parole. In some states this percentage 
goes as high as 95. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION O  LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIOX F 
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: GIRRECTIOXS 391 (1973). If the 35 to 45 percent revocation rate 
is the same today as it was in 1968, it means that 21 to 27 percent of all felons sent to prison 
violate their subsequent parole. 
48Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64; see also, In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 17-20 for a discussion of how 
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that he is more fairly treated as a result of the increased procedural con- 
cern for a strict determination of the truth, and this should aid in his 
rehabilitati~n.~g 
If the reasonable doubt standard of proof were adopted for the factual 
determination stage of the hearing, the standard of review on appeal 
could focus on the sufficiency of the evidence, instead of the present 
limited inquiry into the use of discretionary power. This closer exami- 
nation of the evidence by appellate courts would be another incentive for 
hearing officers to increase the care with which they pass upon the evi- 
dence.50 Use of the reasonable doubt standard of proof in revocation 
hearings would also provide collateral estoppel protection against the 
relitigation of issues already determined at trial, preventing incongruous 
results like the decision reached in Standlee. 
B. Collateral Estoppel and Acquitted Parolees 
Even if the higher standard of proof is not adopted, the fifth amend- 
ment's double jeopardy clause should be held to prohibit the result 
reached in Standlee, regardless of the due process issues. The Supreme 
Court has applied the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to 
the states through the fourteenth amendment,51 and included, as a part of 
double jeopardy, the doctrine of collateral est0ppel.5~ As authority for 
denying the application of collateral estoppel, the Washington Supreme 
Court relied on Helvering v. Mitchel153 and Neaderland v. Commis- 
sioner.54 The court cited these two cases for the proposition that if there 
is a different standard of proof in a subsequent civil case, the previous 
criminal acquittal is not a bar to the relitigation of issues in the civil 
action.55 In fact, this is the present majority rule as it applies to a crimi- 
nal trial and a subsequent parole revocation hearing56 
the supposed good intentions in a hearing that lacks procedural due process protections can 
result in high-handed treatment of the juvenile. 
Wohen, supra note 7, at 214-15; Parole Revocation Procedures, supra note 14, at 309 & n.6. 
50The added burden on the parole board resulting from the shift to the reasonable doubt 
standard of proof would be no greater than that which has resulted from changing the stan- 
dard in juvenile hearings. Of that change the Supreme Court has said it would not "compel 
the states to abandon or displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process." Win- 
ship, 397 U.S. at 367. 
51Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 
(1937). 
s2Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). 
53303 U.S. 391 (1938). 
54424 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1970). 
5583 Wash. 2d at 407-08,518 P.2d at 722-23. 
56Powell v. Wainright, 403 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 912 (1969); 
MacLaren v. Denno, 173 F. Supp. 237, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), afgd, 272 F.2d 19, cert. denied, 
363 U.S. 814 (1960); Valdez v. State, 508 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. Cr. App. 1974); contra, In re 
Hall, 63 Cal. 2d 115, 117,45 Cal. Rptr. 133, 135,403 P.2d 389, 391 (1965). 
232 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1975: 
In both Mitchell and Neaderland, the taxpayers were acquitted of 
criminal charges which carried possible punishments of fine and im- 
prisonment. A subsequent civil action was brought by the government 
for payment of the taxes, and in both cases the defense of collateral es- 
toppel was raised. In setting aside the defense, the Supreme Court rea- 
soned in Mitchell that the first proceeding was punitive and that the sub- 
sequent suit was remedial, in which case double jeopardy did not apply.57 
The Court also pointed out that one of the issues in the criminal prosecu- 
tion not litigated in the civil action was whether there was a willful eva- 
sion of the income tax.58 Thus there was not only a different standard of 
proof in the two proceedings, but also different issues and different po- 
tential san~tions.~g The Mitchell Court further asserted in dictum that 
if the two proceedings are both criminal or if the aim of both proceedings 
is to punish the defendant, the relitigation of issues in the second pro- 
ceeding is prohibited by the fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause.60 
There are four questions derived from Mitchell to consider in deter- 
mining whether collateral estoppel should prevent a subsequent litiga- 
tion: (1) Are the standards of proof in the two proceedings the same? (2) 
Are the issues identical in the two proceedings? (3) Are the proceedings 
both criminal? and (4) Are the possible sanctions both punitive? An 
affirmative answer to question (2) is necessary for the principles of col- 
lateral estoppel to apply by definition.61 Since an affirmative answer to 
either question (3) or (4) will suffice for collateral estoppel to bar the sub- 
sequent proceeding,G2 question (1) need not be answered affirmatively. 
In Standlee, even though the standards of proof for the criminal trial 
and the revocation hearing were different, the only factual issue in each 
proceeding was the identity of the assailant. Thus Standlee is dis- 
tinguishable from Mitchell and Neaderland in that the latter two cases 
did not relitigate identical issues in the subsequent civil action. 
In attempting to obtain an affirmative answer to question (3) parolees 
must show that a revocation hearing is a criminal proceeding for purposes 
of double jeopardy analysis. This is difficult because courts have not 
s7303 U.S. at 404-05. 
58Id. at 397-99. 
59Zd. at 397. The court in Neaderland did not examine the sanctions, but did indicate that 
the nature of the two proceedings, the standard of proof, and the issues were different as be- 
tween the trial and the civil action. 424 F.2d at 64143.  The holding of the court in hTeader- 
land was that the issue of willfully evading the payment of income tax in a criminal trial is dif- 
ferent from the issue of fraud in a civil action. Id. at 642. The Court in Mitchell only inferred 
that the two issues may be different. 303 U.S. at 398. The only issue presented at the trial and 
the revocation hearing in Standlee was the identity of the assailant. 
60303 U.S. at 398-99; One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 
232,235-37 ( 1  972). 
61See Note 1 supra. 
62See note 60 supra and accompanying text. 
2231 CASE NOTES 233 
precisely defined what type of proceeding a revocation hearing is.63 An 
argument finding some support is that a revocation hearing is enough 
like a criminal proceeding4 to be in the same category as a criminal trial 
for certain purposes. However, as indicated above, courts have declined 
to characterize a revocation hearing as a criminal proceeding for the pur- 
poses of due process,65 but this is not necessarily true under double jeop- 
ardy requirements. Double jeopardy guarantees focus more on the pos- 
sibility of two criminal sanctions for one crime. Since a revocation hear- 
ing may ultimately result in imprisonment, it is more like a criminal trial 
than a civil proceeding. The Supreme Court, in the context of a for- 
feiture action, has held that a proceeding may be civil in form but crimi- 
nal in nature, and that this criminal nature is sufficient to require the 
imposition of double jeopardy guarantees when the forfeiture action 
follows a criminal trial.66 Certainly this same reasoning applies to the 
forfeiture of liberty involved in a revocation hearing. 
In connection with question (4) above, the strongest argument under 
the Mitchell inquiry for the application of collateral estoppel for parolees 
in cases like Standlee is that the ultimate sanctions of a criminal trial and 
a revocation hearing are both punitive. It is obvious that the sanctions 
are the same in degree if not in purpose. Even though it is widely held 
that a parolee is reincarcerated and punished only for the original crime 
when found guilty of parole violations,67 it does not comport with 
reality68 to say that he is not being punished for his parole violations. His 
punishment for his parole violation is the loss of his conditional freedom, 
and this cannot be considered a remedial sanction. Consequently, there 
is not the distinction in Standlee between a trial with a punitive sanction 
and a civil action with a remedial sanction as in the tax cases, for both 
proceedings in Standlee carried punitive sanctions. 
It appears, therefore, that the Mitchell rationale would require appli- 
cation of double jeopardy guarantees in Stand lee, even though different 
standards of proof may be upheld with respect to a trial and a revocation 
hearing. The criminal nature of the revocation proceeding and the puni- 
tive nature of its sanction seem to require the operation of double jeop- 
ardy principles to prohibit the relitigation of identical issues in the revo- 
63Courts usually only go so far as to state that a revocation hearing is not a criminal proceed- 
ing and point to differences between a trial and the revocation hearing as the court did in 
Standlee. 
64United States v. Bright, 471 F.2d 723,726 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973). 
The court said, "a parole revocation proceeding, subjecting the parolee to imprisonment, is 
assuredly a 'criminal proceeding.' " It limited this, however, to 26 U.S.C. 8 5848 (1971). 
65408 U.S. at 480. 
66United States v. United States Coin and Currency,~401 U.S. 715, 718 (1970); Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616,634 (1886). 
67See, e.g., People v. Morgan, 55 111. App. 2d 157,204 N.E.2d 314,3 16 (1965). 
68The Parole System, supra note 14, at 293-95. 
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cation hearings. The recent Illinois Supreme Court case of People v.  
Grayson69 directly supports this position. Grayson had been indicted for 
armed robbery while on probation, but at the criminal trial the judge 
found that there was insufficient evidence to find guilt beyond a reason- 
able doubt. A petition to revoke Grayson's probation was granted based 
on the same armed robbery. The court reversed the revocation, holding 
that collateral estoppel applied and was a bar to the relitigation of issues 
already determined at trial. The court said that the differences between 
a criminal trial and revocation hearing were not sufficient to prevent 
collateral estoppel protections, specifically stating that the different 
standards of proof "could not fairly serve to permit relitigation of the 
identical issue upon the same e~idence."~O Grayson appears to better 
represent the requirements set forth in Mitchell and Neaderland as to 
when collateral estoppel should apply than does Standlee. 
A popular phrase reflects the conviction that "a man should not have 
to run the gantlet twice for the same charge."T1 In reality the petitioner 
in Standlee was subjected to the risk of imprisonment for the same 
charges in two different proceedings. Of a situation involving two trials 
the Supreme Court said: 
"No doubt the prosecutor felt the state had a provable case on the first 
charge, and, when he lost, he did what every good attorney would do - 
he refined his presentation [in the second trial] in light of the turn of 
events in the first trial." But this is precisely what the constitutional 
guarantee forbids.72 
The same reasoning should apply to parolees who have been acquitted at 
criminal proceedings and then are required to again "run the gantlet" at 
revocation hearings.73 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is likely that the Supreme Court will need to clarify which standard 
of proof is required to uphold the principles set down in Morrissey and 
- 
69People v. Grayson, 319 N.E.2d 43 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1974); accord., In re Hall, 63 Cal. 2d 115, 
117,63 Cal. Rptr. 133, 135,403 P.2d 389,391 (1965). 
'O319 N.E.2d at 45. 
'lwinship, 397 U.S. at 446. 
721d. at 447, quoting the brief for the state. 
'3A completely different situation arises where a parole board revokes the parole, and sub- 
sequently a criminal trial is instituted to prosecute the suspect for the same crimes which were 
the basis for his parole revocation. When the parole board revokes parole, it does so on the 
jurisdiction it maintains over the parolee because of his previous crime. The board is justified 
in finding a violation of parole based on a trial conviction or mere parole violations. On the 
other hand, the trial court gets jurisdiction because of the commission of the new crimes, and a 
parolee's right to a jury trial of the new crimes with all other constitutional protections pro- 
vided at a trial prevents a reliance on the factual determinations made at the revocation hear- 
ing. 
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Gagnon. This is a fertile area for parolees anxious to test their status 
under the expanding requirements of due process and the newly develop- 
ing double jeopardy doctrine. Also, a precise definition of the standard 
of proof to be used in federal parole revocation hearings is needed. A 
radical modification of the standard of proof in revocation hearings will 
likely be difficult to achieve. Even though there are constitutional argu- 
ments favoring the change, the due process principles are sufficiently 
elusive to support either position.' 
In assessing the potential success of challenges to the law enunciated in 
Standlee, it is likely that an argument based upon the double jeopardy 
doctrine will be the stronger approach. First, there is already support for 
the position, as indicated by G r ~ y s o n . ~ ~  Second, the fifth amendment 
does not draw distinctions among the many types of proceedings, nor is 
the double jeopardy clause restricted to criminal trials. A single sover- 
eign should not be able to circumvent a constitutionally guaranteed free- 
dom by drawing meaningless distinctions between two closely related 
proceedings. Finally, the constitutional protection afforded by the 
double jeopardy doctrine in cases such as Standlee appeals to notions of 
fairness and justice, which may prove to be the single most important 
consideration when the question ultimately reaches the Supreme Court. 
Elections - CORRUPT PRACTICES -CORPORATE MONEY CONTRIBU- 
TIONS TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF BALLOT-MEASURE CAMPAIGNS -
Schwartz v .  Romnes, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974). 
On May 24, 1971, the New York Legislature enacted the Transporta- 
tion Capital Facilities Bond Act of 1971 which authorized the State 
Comptroller to issue bonds in the amount of $2.5 billion upon approval 
by the voters in the 1971 general election.' A nonprofit corporation, 
Yes for Transportation in New York State, Inc. (YES), was organized on 
August 24, 197 1, to campaign for voter approval of the Act. YES received 
individual and corporate contributions, including $50,000 from the New 
York Telephone Company (NYT), a wholly owned subsidiary of Ameri- 
can Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T). 
By letter dated January 26, 1972, the executive director of the Project 
on Corporate Responsibility (Project), a nonprofit corporation owning 
one share of AT&T stock, notified the Chairman of the Board of AT&T 
and the President of NYT of the Project's belief that NYT's $50,000 
contribution to YES violated section 460 of the New York Election Law 
74319 N.E.2d 43. 
'N.Y. CONST. art. VII, 5 1 1  disallows any legislative enactment which increases the public 
debt unless approved by a majority of the voters in a general election. The Capital Facilities 
Bond Act of 197 1 was not so approved in New York's 197 1 general election. 
